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Driven by policy making at the European level (Hyman, 2010), statutory intervention in the 
employment relationship in the UK has grown significantly over the last fifteen years. 
“Britain has been experiencing an important shift in the locus of job regulation, from 
‘collective bargaining to ‘legal enactment’”(Colling, 2004, p.555). This in turn has raised 
important questions about how trade unions can adapt to this new environment. Many 
scholars have argued that increasingly complicated legislative structures and norms have not 
ensured direct compliance in the workplace (Dickens, 2012). The fragmentation of the law 
and the weak articulation of social and legal regulations largely explain the gaps in coverage 
and compliance (Colling, 2010). Increased individual rights have been criticised for being 
tentative in ambition and complex in application (Dickens and Hall, 2006) while failing to 
address the systemic nature of gender and race inequalities. Against this background, the 
political and academic debate is now focused on consideration of the mechanisms, institutions 
and processes for rights enforcement. Between purely “voluntarist” approaches and 
controlling forms of law, other “reflexive” legal mechanisms are being explored as ways to 
make rights effective (Deakin, McLaughlin and Chai, 2012). While many studies advocate an 
enhanced role for collective regulation (Dickens, 2007, 2000; Colling and Dickens 1989; 
Cockburn, 1995) and point to the limits of individual litigation, the ability of British unions to 
enforce legislation seems variable and constrained. Their weakened position in the policy- 
making process, their declining membership, the narrowing of collective bargaining coverage 
and the difficulties they encounter in implementing representative actions cast doubt on the 
prospect of “recombinant legal strategies” to enforce employment rights (Colling, 2012). 
While scholars argue that growing litigation fills a space left by the decline of industrial 
bargaining (Renton, 2012), the process of “juridification” calls for a close investigation of 
how formal rights are enforced in practice and what roles are assumed by unions.  
 
From this perspective, the use of litigation by British trade unions to promote equal pay seems 
an interesting case to examine1. Despite their traditional mistrust of the use of the law and 
individual rights (Colling, 2011) and their uneasy relationship with the concept of equality 
(Conley, 2013), British trade unions have used the law in various ways (McCann, 1994) in 
order to advance both gender and pay equality. They have campaigned for national 
legislation. Since 1970, they have been making use of European legislation to improve legal 
norms and build a strong body of case law (Howell, 1996), sometimes with the help of 
enforcement agencies (Alter and Vargas, 2000; Barnard, 1996). They have developed legal 
expertise and detailed knowledge of the practicalities of the law and have supported numerous 
equal pay claims. Compared to other European countries, the level of litigation in this field is 
very high (Fuchs, 2013) and the role of trade unions in this process quite significant2. 
Furthermore, the equal pay claims and the legal strategies developed by trade unions in order 
to seek redress have been framed in such a way as to address some of the major limitations 
academic commentators have identified in the use of the law. First, the claims have generally 
been joint claims brought by a large number of workers, often poorly qualified and low-paid 
women, who are usually underrepresented among tribunal cases (Colling, 2006). Second, 
litigation has sometimes helped to secure bargaining outcomes, forcing employers to engage 
in negotiating large-scale collective agreements (Colling, 2011).  
 
 
                                               
1
 The five most common categories of claims before the Tribunals in 2010-2011 were unfair dismissal, wages, 
breach of contract, equal pay and working time claims (Renton, 2012, p.39). 
2
 Most studies show that union support is central to the outcomes of the claim. Applicants with no legal 
representation have a poor success rate in employment tribunal hearings (Pollert, 2007). 
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Trade unions as legal intermediaries 
 
However, this use of litigation has not developed consistently over time and across unions 
(see Table 2). Previous studies have shown that trade unions began to develop legal strategies 
when the limitations of collective bargaining became evident (Colling, 2006). Nevertheless, 
litigation has been quite controversial within the trade union movement. Certain reservations 
pertaining, among other things, to the high financial and emotional costs for plaintiffs and 
their trade unions, the fear that individual claims may fragment the union movement and the 
necessary reliance on lawyers (McCann, 1994) have traditionally deterred trade unions from 
going to law. Defending individual interests can be seen as a drain on resources and time, 
while not permitting collective benefits to be secured or encouraging active membership 
(Colling, 2006). Other, specifically British constraints may also deter trade unions from taking 
legal action. The employment tribunal system itself and the principles of common law render 
access to justice quite uncertain (Renton, 2012). Problems of low success rates for employees 
pursuing their rights through tribunals have long been documented (Leonard, 1987; Dickens 
et al., 1985). Despite the growing range of jurisdictions in which employment tribunals are 
required to adjudicate, access to justice has been progressively reduced through the restriction 
of legal aid, the policy of privatising legal enforcement by expanding the no-win, no fee 
sector (Renton, 2012, Pollert, 2007), increased legal costs for plaintiffs and new obligations to 
comply with statutory procedures. “The 2002 Employment Act produced new rights for 
workers with laws that rendered them further out of reach” (Pollert, 2007, p.132; Colling, 
2004).  
 
Despite these symbolic and practical hurdles, this paper seeks to investigate the conditions 
under which trade unions have decided to rely upon litigation to further their female 
members’ interests. This focus on trade unions as “legal intermediaries” is quite rare (Colling, 
2006). While most scholars have examined the strategies and practices of “cause lawyers” in 
the promotion of rights (Sarat and Scheingold, 1998), less work has been done on other types 
of “legal intermediaries”, such as NGOs (Vanhala, 2011) or enforcement agencies (Hepple 
2012; Pedriana and Stryker, 2004; Alter and Vargas, 2000; Barnard, 1996), although these 
organisations are key actors in raising awareness of rights, facilitating (or deterring) access to 
justice and implementing anti-discrimination law. Previous research has shown that the reality 
of having recourse to law is more complex than mere adaptation to political contexts 
(Kitschelt, 1986) or legal opportunity structures (Andersen, 2005). From an interactionist 
perspective, litigation needs to be analysed in terms of the relations between litigants, their 
“support structures” (Epp, 1998) and the other “players” involved in the legal process.  
 
In the employment field, other studies emphasize how power in the employment relation 
shapes workers’ perception of their options for enforcing their rights (Albiston, 2005). 
Besides the fact that employers usually have more power than their employees over the 
workplace, which can deter employees from resorting to the law for fear of negative 
consequences, the role of trade unions in releasing information about rights is critical to name 
the injustice and blame the employer (Felstiner, Abel and Sarat, 1981). However, the use of 
the law by unions can also be analysed as an attractive strategy “in circumstances where 
objectives are unlikely to be secured by collective strength alone” (Colling, 2006, p.145). 
Litigation is then seen as a sign of unions’ weakened power. Power relations within the trade 
union movement itself also have to be taken into consideration when looking at the use of the 
law. In the field of equality rights, industrial relations scholars have pointed out the difficulty 
unions can have in addressing gendered divergent interests among their members 
(McLaughlin, 2014; Fredman, 2008; McCrudden, 2007). For example, job evaluation 
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 3
schemes negotiated with trade unions have sometimes been responsible for increased 
litigation, as they blatantly reproduced wage differentials or failed to correct them (Kahn and 
Meehan, 1992; Acker 1989). Implementing equal pay means reassessing gender-blind 
concepts of skill and jobs by making comparisons between craft and white-collar jobs, men 
and women’s grading structures. British trade unions have frequently been reluctant to do so. 
In the 2000’s, their tendency to preserve the situation of their (more organized and more 
vocal) male members has exposed unions to litigation in the public-sector3. 
 
Moreover, use of the law is not only embedded in power relations but also interacts with 
alternative normative systems when “ new rights attempt to change long-standing social 
practices” (Albiston, 2005, p.13), such as institutionalized conceptions of “industrial 
relations” as well as gendered conceptions of work. Equal pay litigation reveals not only 
“deep scepticism about the practical value of statutory rights and their formal enforcement” 
(Colling, 2006, p.152) and trade unionists’ preference for collective bargaining but also their 
implicit representations of the value of women’ work. The “underevaluation of women’s 
work” which results in the fact that women are paid less for the same level of efficiency 
within the same job and are employed in jobs or occupations that are themselves undervalued, 
is an ongoing process, shaped by the actions of employers, governments, trade unions and 
other social actors in specific contexts (Grimshaw, Rubery, 2007). 
 
It is argued in this paper that, despite their ability to act as a “support structure” (Epp, 1998) 
and the framing of their members as “rights holders” (Vanhala, 2011), trade unions have 
varied in their efforts to use the law in order to enforce equal pay rights. Their willingness to 
do so has depended not only on their ability to challenge unequal power relations in the 
workplace and balance their members’ diverging interests but also on their capacity for 
renegotiating the value of women’s work. As in previous research (Colling, 2006), I will 
emphasize the crucial role of individual officers who decided to engage with the law despite 
few incentives to do so. I argue that, in the early period of the development of trade unions’ 
litigation strategies, low-paid women involved in grass-roots campaigns managed to enlist the 
support of some fairly militant and strong trade unions in order to obtain new legislation and 
make the first claims. However, they did not succeed in challenging the gendered nature of 
the wage hierarchy. In the second phase, it is argued that the European-based legal strategy 
adopted by the Equal Opportunities Commission facilitated the decision of a few trade 
unionists to support significant equal pay cases, before coming up against the adversarial 
nature of the legal strategies developed by employers. I then describe how, in a third phase, 
the introduction of privatisation and contracting-out policies by the Conservative governments 
persuaded some public-sector trade unionists to resort to defensive litigation strategies aimed 
at protecting the interests of their male members, finding a way to defend the wages of low-
paid women and forcing public employers to address gender inequalities through collective 
bargaining. Finally, I reflect on the conditions under which these trade unionists resorted to 
litigation, emphasising the crucial significance of their ability to challenge implicit 
assumptions not only about gender and class issues but also about the very role of trade 
unions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3
 Case GMB v Mrs Allen and others, [2007] IRLR 752 ETA. 
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Methodology 
 
To understand how litigation strategies aimed at tackling pay discrimination have evolved 
over time and developed in relation to and through interaction with trade unions, employers, 
enforcement agencies and lawyers, this article builds on a multi-methods approach based on a 
total of 34 interviews with trade unionists, legal practitioners and experts (see Table 1), 
archives analysis and statistical data. Interviewees were selected because of their engagement 
in equal pay landmark cases identified either through media coverage for the most recent 
cases or through historical documentaries such as the TUC « Winning Equal Pay » film4. 
Long-serving trade union officials helped in finding former local officers, some of whom are 
now retired. My intention was to understand how equality rights and policies have been 
utilized by local trade unionists depending on periods. I asked the respondents to narrate the 
circumstances of the litigation they had been involved with, their role in the legal process, the 
difficulties they encountered, their relations with the claimants and employers, the role of 
experts and lawyers and finally their views on the use of the law.  To complement these 
interviews and to cover the 1970s and 80s, I studied the Trades Union Congress Library 
Collections at London Metropolitan University and the former EOC archives in Manchester. I 
also collected employment tribunal statistics from 1975 onwards and compiled the data (see 
Table 2) in order to get an idea of the trends in litigation over the 40-year period. Finally, I 
went through the legal literature on the landmark equal pay cases since 1984. This project 
forms part of a comparative project on women and trade unions in France and the UK that is 
investigating the relations between internal and external equality policies (Author, colleague, 
2011). Following McCann’s work, this paper adopts a « developmental approach » (McCann, 
1994) and divides the development of union litigation strategies for equal pay into a number 
of stages or phases. The paper examines to what extent and under what conditions trade 
unionists have turned to the courts to promote equal pay. 
 
1968-1980: grass-roots movements begin to break down trade unions’ reluctance to 
represent women’s interests  
 
Historical studies have established that craft unions in the UK fought hard against the 
inclusion of women (Cockburn, 1983) and supported the stratification of the labour force that 
maintained women as a class apart (Downs, 1995). Unions defended the preservation of 
separate pay grades for men and women and were not supportive of equal pay demands, not 
only because they undermined the struggle for a “family wage” (Rose, 1988) but also in 
response to employers’ strategies of lowering labour costs by hiring women or introducing 
new technology and more intensive forms of work organization (Downs, 1990). While 
general unions organizing large numbers of low-skilled workers were more ambivalent 
towards women and tried to recruit them, they were also reluctant to support equal pay 
demands and defended the maintenance of separate collective bargaining (Savage, 1988). In 
the civil service, only skilled women were granted equal pay in 1947. Female teachers had to 
wait until 1953.  
 
In the UK, the first Equal Pay Act was introduced in 1970, following a memorable strike led 
by female workers at the Ford factory in Dagenham in 1968. The 187 sewing machinists went 
on strike to get a re-grading of their jobs, which had been under-evaluated as a new wage 
structure was being introduced in 1967. While they had been encouraged by their union 
leaders to adopt an equal pay strategy, they obtained neither equal pay nor the grading they 
                                               
4
 Equal pay struggle is now well documented. A movie and now a musical – Made in Dagenham -  have been 
produced to relate the epic strike for equal pay in the Ford Dagenham factory. 
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were asking for. As Sheila Cohen points out trade unions (and management) advocated this 
equal pay claim for women in order to avoid encouraging male semi-skilled workers across 
Ford to demand the same re-grading (Cohen, 2013). The women got a pay rise and a promise 
from Barbara Castle, the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity, that she would 
soon introduce equal pay legislation. There were other reasons why national legislation was 
introduced, including the risk of stricter legislation being imposed by the European 
Community, which the UK was about to join. The legislation adopted in 1970 gave employers 
five years to correct the most blatant direct forms of discrimination, such as the persistence of 
“women’s rates”. Between 1970 and 1980, women workers maintained the pressure on 
employers and numerous women’s strikes against low wages were reported (Pugh, 2000), 
some of them explicitly linked to equal pay demands. These ‘hard-fought grass root 
campaigns” (Elliott, 1984) were often supported by socialist feminists, affiliated to left-wing 
organizations (Rowbotham, 2006) and benefited from extensive media coverage in feminist 
journals, such as Socialist Women or Women’s Voice. These mobilizations had an impact on 
the legislation but also on unions. In 1968, the first equal pay conference was held at the 
TUC5. Feminized unions, like NALGO6, in the public sector, adopted the charter as policy. 
The first equality structures were set up within some trade unions.  
 
Following the enforcement of the Equal Pay Act in December 1975, numerous claims were 
lodged by low-paid women, sometimes with the help of trade unions. However, early studies 
of the use of the equal pay legislation highlight the unsympathetic attitude of judges, ACAS7 
experts and trade unionists towards complainants. They often had only a vague understanding 
of the law and gave incorrect advice (Leonard, 1987) or tried to dissuade claimants from 
proceeding to the tribunal hearing and pressed them to accept poor offers from employers 
(Gregory, 1982). Between 1975 and 1982, the number of claims dropped sharply from 1800 
in 1976 to 39 in 1982, notably because employers abolished the separate male and female pay 
scales. In doing so, they reinforced the gendered job segregation and maintained separate 
collective bargaining for different groups, which made the use of the law more difficult, as the 
Equal Pay Act stipulates equal pay only for “like work” or “jobs rated as equivalent”. 
 
“Now, following the Equal Pay Act, there was an implementation period. And there was a lot of 
negotiation within work places to get rid of the separate male and female pay scales. The 
original Equal Pay Act only covered equal pay for like work. Which is the same or very similar 
work, or work rated as equivalent under a job evaluation scheme. And so, you know, I would 
say that once there was this success in getting the Act, the focus of union activity was around 
those negotiations to get rid of male/female pay structures and to provide equal pay....” (Female 
senior officer, TUC) 
 
Furthermore, becoming conversant with the new legislation and the financial commitment 
linked to litigation were perceived as huge burdens for small unions. In feminised unions, 
such as APEX8, or in industries where female workers were numerous (like fishing), the issue 
of women’s lower pay was dealt with for preference through collective modes of regulation 
such as the Fair Wages Resolution (Schedule 119), which allowed women who were paid 
lower rates than the rate of pay for the district in which they were working to make a claim to 
the Central Arbitration Committee10 for an increase in pay rates. These collective 
                                               
5
 Trade Union Congress 
6
 National Association of Local Government Officers 
7
 ACAS is an organisation devoted to preventing and resolving employment disputes. 
8
 Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staffs 
9
 of the Employment Protection Act (1975) 
10
 The CAC is a permanent independent body with statutory powers whose role is to resolve disputes. 
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mechanisms, which were abolished after Margaret Thatcher came into office in 1979, were 
seen as more efficient than the use of litigation, even if they were sometimes ignored by male 
trade unionists. 
 
“There was something called Schedule 11, which said that if you were paying lower rates than 
the rate of pay for the district in which you worked, and the industry in which you worked, you 
could make a claim to the Central Arbitration Committee for an increase in pay rates. Well, 
many women would have been at the bottom of the pay structures, so you can see the impact of 
that. We also had another mechanism, this was Wages Council. We had a whole series of 
mechanisms which could be thought of to be as successful as the Equal Pay Act. And they 
weren’t used, I don’t think, as much as we could have used them. Trade unions run by men, lack 
of imagination, the old traditional way of negotiating was face to face with the employer. People 
didn’t think about using these institutions that had been set up.” (Former female legal officer, 
APEX/GMB) 
 
If the restrictions of the law itself reduced the opportunities for unions to litigate on behalf of 
their members, this first stage in the use of litigation highlights the importance of power 
relations between employers and workers, since implementation of the law has to be seen 
against the background of considerable unrest, including strikes, that characterised British 
industrial relations in the late 60’s. However employers’ strategies for delaying the 
implementation of equal pay11 while getting rid of the most obvious discriminations certainly 
had a deterrent effect on trade unions’ use of litigation. While these early claims helped local 
trade unionists to accept the principle of equal pay for equal work, the implicit under-
evaluation of women’s work had not really been challenged at this stage. At that period, 
feminist scholars criticized the collusion of unions with management to minimize the effects 
of the equal pay legislation in the existing grading and pay systems (Snell, 1979). 
 
1980-1988: the EOC stimulates the mobilization of trade unions 
 
Beginning in the early 1980s, the Equal Opportunities Commission12, which considered the 
Equal Pay Act to be too limited in its scope adopted a litigation strategy that sought to take 
advantage of European legislation in order to counter the narrow rulings from the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal (Alter, Vargas, 2000) and work for the introduction of an 
“equal value” amendment in 1984. Although it was not described as feminist in the early 
years of its existence (Gregory, 1987), the EOC used its independence and narrow mandate to 
develop strategic litigation, picking up the first 60 claims for equal value. This strategy helped 
to build a strong body of case law and gradually attracted the support of the judiciary (Alter 
and Vargas, 2000). Its success had a great impact on trade unions, along with other training 
measures and the support provided for trade unionists in the administration of equal pay 
claims (paying for the costs, providing legal advice, etc.). The number of claims began to rise 
again (380 in 1986, 570 in 1987, 1000 in 1988)13. These single cases were very often 
supported by male trade unionists able to identify inequalities in pay and practices and to take 
action to change them.  
 
                                               
11
 The sewing machinists got their regrading in 1985. 
12
 The EOC was set up under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and had statutory powers to help enforce this Act. 
The EOC was given the power to apply for judicial review, to intervene in court proceedings and to carry out 
formal investigations. 
13
 The 1984 amendment opened up the possibility of taking cases on the ground of equal value, but took away 
the provision on collective remedies, via the Central Arbitration Committee. 
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A well-known trade unionist from the TGWU14 generated 18 claims between 1983 and 
200215. Appointed as a full time officer in 1977, he started to develop an interest in equal pay 
after his wife, an active trade unionist, made him realise that the system they had negotiated in 
1979, whereby female part-timers were to be made redundant in preference to male full-
timers, was highly discriminatory. He took eight equal value cases in the four years from 1983 
to 1987, using a pro-active strategy of raising women’s consciousness, giving them 
information on the existing legislation and addressing their fears and gendered conceptions: 
“a few think they ought to earn less than men; a great many don’t realize how skilled they 
are; some are frightened for their jobs” (Cunnison, 1988, p.9). As well as convincing the 
women that they should get equal pay, he “convinced the men that the biggest threat they’ve 
got was cheap labour working alongside them” (Cunnison, 1988, p.29). After having lost a 
like-work case for the women packers in the Smales fish processing factory in 1981, he 
decided to take their case again under the new equal value legislation. He enlisted the aid of 
the EOC, having been let down by the TGWU legal department. The EOC provided him with 
the services of a professional management consultant to advise on the job evaluation expert 
report and a barrister to argue the women’s case at the tribunal, but he conducted the case 
himself16. The women won and the company accepted the judgement and paid up. 
 
Most of these claims in the private sector were brought by feminized unions such as APEX or 
general unions such as the TGWU17 or GMB. These unions were used to plant bargaining but 
in some cases they had clearly expressed a wish to recruit and defend the interests of low-paid 
women18. The claims were triggered by the first wave of women officials appointed by these 
unions (Author, 2013) with the help of very knowledgeable (and feminist) lawyers to fight the 
cases. 
 
“In 1978, I was appointed as an area organiser by APEX. Coventry is a historic industrial city, 
very well unionised, with very high union densities. And the union which represented primarily 
clerical workers had about 80% women membership. So we had high levels of union 
membership, high numbers of women. Because we were committed to campaigning and 
committed to women’s issues, we had campaigns, for example around cervical cancer screening 
for women. And we started to look at some of the pay issues, led by Rita Steven, who was the 
national officer and who played a particular role in this. She said, every officer must have three 
equal pay claims going. So we went and looked around the factories, and started running 
claims.” (Former male organizer, APEX) 
 
At the local level, some trade unionists certainly saw legal litigation on equal pay as a 
possible lever to attract new (female) members. At the same time, they also saw the potential 
of equal pay litigation as a means of fighting the public-sector pay freeze imposed by the Tory 
government, as a former COHSE19 officer explains : “when there’s a nationally imposed pay 
freeze, you could take an equal pay claim on behalf of a group of workers, which would 
                                               
14
 Transport and General Workers' Union 
15
 This case was described in a working paper from the Hull Centre for Gender Studies by Sheila Cunnison who 
interviewed extensively this trade unionist (Cunnison, 1988) and in the documentary « Catch of the Day: Hull 
Fish Packers Win Equal Pay », Winning Equal Pay, TUC Library Collections, London Metropolitan University. 
16
 The Smale case cost the union around £300 and the EOC £5,5000 (Cunnison, 1988). By comparison the 
Hayward case cost £50,000, because it went to the House of Lords and the union used professional lawyers. 
17
 In 1987, the TGWU launched a national recruitment campaign called ‘Link Up’ aimed at temporary and part-
time workers (Howell, 1996) 
18
 In 1987, the GMB published a pamphlet called « Winning a fair deal for women ». The campaign aimed at 
moving women’s issues up the bargaining agenda. It set out 13 issues such as unsocial hours, job evaluation 
scheme, regarding and new technology (Howell, 1996). 
19
 Confederation of Health Service Employees 
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actually cause a shift. It can give you a way through. The employers are more likely to level 
up maybe not for everyone, but for some groups”.  
 
If few of them would have described themselves as “feminist”, most of these men were 
convinced that equal pay was a “bread and butter classic issue”. This working-class trade 
union framing was linked to their own backgrounds, many of them being the sons of trade 
unionists, as well as to their leftist political leanings and, in some cases, their close working 
relationships with low-paid women. 
 
“I got a job as a care worker at sort of 18, working with elderly people. And I did that for years. 
Usually all my colleagues were women. When I was seconded to my union, I represented those 
same care workers. And I was always proud of the fact that I was one of them. And they always 
kept me level-headed. When I was a UNISON lay activist and then got a job with the GMB, it 
was very touching for me because lots and lots of care workers switched to the GMB” (former 
male regional officer, GMB) 
 
Often younger than their union colleagues when they became union officers, most of them 
were less firmly embedded in the male-dominated structures of the union movement and had 
more faith in the use of law, compared to other forms of action such as striking. As one 
lawyer puts it: “I think some of the more pragmatic trade unionists realised that actually 
lawyers could deliver something that was useful”. However, almost all of them had to face 
strong opposition from their union hierarchy, especially when their union branch used to 
represent skilled workers who did not want their jobs to be part of a re-evaluation process that 
might have consequences for their wages. Because of the impact in terms of membership, 
many of them had to face strong internal attacks, as their success in building up a new female 
membership was perceived as a threat to the existing leadership. Moreover, because of the 
strong links between the Labour Party and trade unions, some of their union colleagues and 
superiors were afraid of  “rocking the boat” and upsetting the status quo with Labour-led 
councils. 
 
“We were pursuing a twin track strategy. We made the claim domestically and we also 
submitted Employment Tribunal applications. We went to the women and said, fill in the union 
application form, sign this pre-printed Employment Tribunal application form, and we’re in it 
together. And the membership started to build. It was the best and easiest recruitment campaign 
I have ever had in my life. The employers complained, naturally, to the late Mick Graham who 
was the national officer. He took it up with John Edmonds, the General Secretary. And I started 
getting people warning me off.  And then the political support was withdrawn from me. I was 
bullied and threatened, and I had a nervous breakdown. It was about internal union politics and 
a concern that somebody was trying to build a power base and a reputation independently of the 
autocracy that most unions have. Not true. Not guilty. My Regional Secretary thought I wanted 
his job. He thought I was building a power base to get rid of him” (Former male organizer, 
GMB) 
 
Despite these internal difficulties, most of the claims they supported were successful. They 
were made by individual applicants or by no more than 50-60 applicants, particularly in the 
public sector, which made their administration by the employment tribunal feasible, as one 
EOC expert stated: “Employment Tribunal is set up to deal with a lot of employment issues, 
not just discrimination. And it is designed to hear individual cases. It was never designed to 
hear multiple claims, but with good lawyers on both sides and a reasonably experienced chair 
of the tribunal, they could cope with fifty or sixty applicants ». Some of them were very 
successful, even though they took quite a long time to settle and were used by trade unions to 
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improve their profile among women workers. They included the well-known case of Julie 
Hayward20, which was supported by the GMB (and the EOC). 
 
“She won and the good thing about the Julie Hayward case which was the first one, was she 
won all the way through. She won at tribunal. And she won at the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal, and she subsequently won at the House of Lords. So the unions were able to ride the 
positive publicity all the way through” (Former Head of the Equal Pay Unit, EOC) 
 
Moreover, in the private sector, small feminized unions, such as USDAW21 or BIFU22, used 
the threat of legal action to force employers to introduce integrated job evaluation systems, 
which were believed to be free of sex discrimination (Arthurs, 1992) and which did indeed 
lead to many low-qualified female workers being upgraded (e.g. clerical staff in the banking 
industry). As Howell points out, “USDAW’s relative success in recruiting new female 
members at supermarkets is credited in large part to its aggressive use of equal pay litigation” 
(Howell, 1996, p.533). In the utilities sector (electricity, gas, water), many privatised 
companies also introduced job evaluation schemes that helped to calm the equal pay 
campaigns  (Gilbert, Secker, 1995). Likewise, in the public sector, the major unions pushed 
employers (and the government) to undertake a wide pay and grading review for manual 
workers in local government in 1988 (Dickens, Townley, Winchester, 1988), which was seen 
as a way to avoid further litigation but which left open the possibility of litigation for non-
manual workers, such as the case of the speech therapists23, which marked the onset of huge 
multiple claims in the public sector. Many agreements of this sort were never implemented 
because of the extensive restructuring that took place in the 1980s in the public sector and 
also because of the decimation of some industries, such as printing (Dawson, 2011). 
 
By the end of the 1980s, the number of multiple claims involving more than 1000 claimants 
started to increase. This significantly raised the number of claims registered by Employment 
Tribunals, although they were concentrated in only a few workplaces24. Supported by small 
trade unions, such as MSF25 in the speech therapists’26 case or the NUM27 in the case of 
British Coal28, these cases often took a very long time to be settled and were very costly for 
the unions. Although they were important in terms of case law, these hard-fought equal value 
cases seemed to have a deterrent effect on trade unions, since they marked the end of the 
“golden age” for equal pay and revealed both the potential and the limitations of the equal 
value amendment. Employers started to make intensive of the opportunities opened up by the 
                                               
20
 Julie Hayward was employed as a cook in the canteen and was responsible for cooking and serving midday 
meals to Cammell Laird employees. She claimed equal pay for work of equal value with male craft workers – a 
shipboard painter, a joiner and a thermal insulation engineer – all of whom received higher craft rates of basic 
pay than she did as a cook. It took seven years for the case to succeed. See “Cooking up a Storm: Julie 
Hayward's Equal Pay Victory », Winning Equal Pay, TUC Library Collections, London Metropolitan University. 
21
 Union of Shop Distributive & Allied Workers. 
22
 Banking, Insurance and Finance Union. 
23
 In 1985, 1200 claims from speech and language therapists (almost all of those working in the health service at 
the time) were submitted. The pay of the comparator group - clinical psychologists and/or hospital pharmacists - 
was negotiated by a separate committee. In 1993, the ECJ held that the fact that the rates of pay for two jobs had 
been arrived at by separate collective bargaining processes was not sufficient to provide objective justification 
under European legislation. See “Speaking Out for Change: Winning Equal Pay for NHS Speech and Language 
Therapists”, Winning Equal Pay, TUC Library Collections, London Metropolitan University. 
24
 Between 1986 and 1995, the number of claims rose from 380 to 3000, but this figure includes multiple claims 
like the speech therapists and the British coal case, which were settled after 1995. 
25
 Manufacturing, Science and Finance 
26
 Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority (1992) C-127/92, [1993] IRLR 
27
 National Union of Mineworkers 
28
 British Coal Corporation v Smith [1996] IRLR 404 
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1984 legislation to build their defence on references to “market forces” and other material 
factors29. Trade unionists discovered that, in practice, litigation was very complicated and 
adversarial.  
 
“In the early days the cases were taken to Tribunal, which was a much less formal process then. 
And they used to be taken by regional officers. Employers started appealing more and more. 
They brought barristers in, and so it’s become a much more legalistic process than it ever was. 
So lots of the earlier equal pay claims, which were fairly simple, would settle. But, there started 
to become a resistance to it and so it became much more technical and much more expensive. 
People didn’t have confidence to take them” (Former female legal officer, APEX/GMB) 
 
The intensive use of the law by some trade unions over that period can be analysed from a 
number of perspectives. First, in a context of huge declines in membership30 and strong 
attacks on union rights, notably in the public sector which provides secure jobs for women, 
some unions took the view that the use of European legislation and especially the Directive on 
Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value, which was enacted into British law in 1984, could help 
to recruit new (female) members and strengthen collective bargaining strategies (Howell, 
1996). Second, under the influence of feminist members and female officials (with assistance 
from the EOC), some trade unions attempted to de-construct the under-evaluation of women’ 
work and address gendered conceptions of work through the inclusion of women’ issues in 
bargaining agendas and the negotiation of new grading systems. Supported in many cases by 
national campaigns and national collective bargaining, legal action depended heavily on the 
initiative of local officers, often male, who had to fight against the fact that “women’s issues 
remained viewed as minority issues” and “that job segregation was largely perceived as just” 
(Howell, 1996, p.531). 
 
1988-2004: Employers’ aggressive privatization strategies reignite litigation  
 
The introduction of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) in 1988 (Escott, Whitfield, 
1995) helped to bring equal pay litigation back on to some public sector trade unionist’s 
agendas, as CCT had major effects on the pay and conditions of women in low-skill jobs. The 
idea was not to get equal pay as it had theoretically been established through the new grading 
system introduced in 1988, but to make sure that the privatisation of hospital and local 
government services could not take it away. Since some local unions had never before had 
recourse to litigation and as equal pay legislation was seen as difficult to handle, trade 
unionists first tried to use other types of legislation, such as the Transfer of Undertakings and 
Protection of Employees Rights31 (TUPE), which could be used as a major defence for not 
cutting the pay and conditions of women workers. Many of these actions failed and some 
unions were driven to bring their complaints under the Equal Pay Act 1970. One such case 
was that brought against North Yorkshire County Council in 198832 by a NUPE33 local 
officer, who took the lead on this landmark case. A total of 1300 catering assistants and 
'dinner ladies' whose rates of pay had been set by reference to a 1987 assessment carried out 
under the local government job evaluation scheme and who were graded equally with road 
                                               
29
 The employer can identify factors  unrelated to sex and prove that they are the real reasons for the difference 
in pay between the woman and her comparator.  
30
 After reaching their peak in 1979, trade union membership levels declined sharply through the 1980s and early 
1990s before stabilising from the mid-1990s onward. 
31
 TUPE regulations stated that where a business entity transferred, the employees were entitled to receive the 
same pay and conditions. 
32
 Ratcliffe and others v North Yorkshire County Council ([1995] IRLR 439. 
33
 The National Union of Public Employees 
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sweepers and gardeners (grade 1) and refuse collectors (grade 2) were to be dismissed and 
then re-employed at a lower rate for the Council to be able to compete with outside firms 
whose tenders were based on lower labour costs. Complaints were brought under the Equal 
Pay Act 1970, claiming equal pay with their comparator categories. This case took seven 
years to be settled by the House of Lords, which found that the women had been unlawfully 
discriminated against and that the employer must pay them at the same rate as their male 
comparators.  
  
Other trade unionists also used the threat of legal action to deter privatisation. One of the most 
famous examples is the Cumbria story that started in 1995 with the involvement of a 
UNISON area organizer who launched an equal pay claim on behalf of 1,600 low-paid 
women (cleaners, telephonists, sterile services staff) who had been under-graded for decades. 
After interrupting his legal action for fear that it would encourage the Conservative 
government to abolish national pay structures, he resurrected it in 1997 after the election of 
Tony Blair. His idea was both to look for a way to raise women’s pay and to fight the 
privatisation of the services by using equal pay claims as a way to deter investors. The 
government said it would cover the cost of the claim. Nevertheless, the case was pursued and 
was eventually settled in 2005 for a total of £300 millions. 
 
In the wake of these trade unionists, often depicted as being ahead of their time, other trade 
local unionists pursued multiple claims in the public sector34, mainly on the grounds of “like 
work” or “rated as equivalent cases”. By the mid-1990s, the discriminatory nature of the 1988 
pay and grading review that had been carried out in the public sector and which maintained 
“productivity” bonuses for men (refuse collectors, gardeners) had become very apparent. A 
GMB regional organizer in the North East initiated a major claim against Cleveland County 
Council that aimed, first, to challenge the effects of CCT on women’s pay and conditions (sex 
discrimination claim) and, second, to challenge the pay differential between women and men 
whose jobs were rated equivalent but whose wages were different (equal pay claim). 
 
“I said to them that if you’re rated as equivalent as a man you’re entitled to the same pay. You 
get the same pay, but the men are getting 40% an hour more. Now, they knew these gardeners 
because these gardeners came to cut the grass and everything. So they could see how the men 
worked and they could see how they worked. And I said, it’s supposed to be productivity. But 
they get it for their holidays. They get it for sickness. It’s superannuated so their pension is 
higher. We’ve asked the Council why the men get it and you don’t get it. And the Council has 
said that the men need an incentive to work harder. The women already work hard enough and 
don’t need it. The men had to have an incentive... the women already did it and they didn’t need 
it.” (Former male regional organizer, GMB) 
 
The subordination of women’s interests to other “general” interests (such as fighting 
privatisation) has been highly criticised by several lawyers who consider that trade unions 
have always pursued cases for reasons unrelated to getting equal pay for women. But this 
famous case was successful. In 1996, the 1500 “dinner ladies” celebrated a £4 million 
negotiated settlement following industrial tribunal claims under equal pay laws. The women 
had already secured over £1 million in a sex discrimination case. Moreover, this case had 
immense implications for other local authorities, as every local authority operated bonus and 
productivity schemes for male manual workers. Almost none offered bonus and productivity 
                                               
34
 Because of the lack of transparency and the individualized nature of the pay systems, the end of centralised 
collective bargaining and the huge decline in membership, very few cases have been supported by trade unions 
in the private sector since the end of the 80s.  
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schemes to female manual workers. As a lawyer puts it: “the result of the Cleveland case was 
to expose a national problem, because the pay structure in local government is almost 
replicated everywhere”. Consequently, and following the settlement of the speech therapists’ 
case in 1993, where the ECJ suggested that separate collective bargaining arrangements could 
not be used as an argument against an equal pay claim35, the Conservative government 
decided to launch negotiations on harmonising the conditions of former administrative, 
professional, technical and clerical (APTC) staff and manual workers in local government 
(single status). In addition, a new job evaluation scheme was developed to address grading 
and equal pay issues. In 2004, the Agenda for Change collective agreement to be applied to 
all directly employed NHS staff (with the exception of doctors, dentists and some very senior 
managers) was also negotiated to avoid further litigation and implement equality within the 
NHS. The negotiation of these two collective agreements that were explicitly designed to 
address gender pay inequalities highlights how the use of the law can challenge cultural 
ideologies and gendered work assumptions (Albiston, 2008) and produce “radiating effects” 
(Colling, 2011; McCann, 1994). However, this story also shows that social change is often 
driven by minority groups who have had to fight against considerable internal and external 
resistance. By contrast, the last period of time (2004-2014) that is not scrutinized in this 
article, clearly shows the limits of local trade unionists’ action when legal processes become 
very legalistic in a context of mass litigation, recurrent use of lawyers, repeated appeal 
strategies by employers and centralisation of claims’ administration within trade unions 
(McLaughlin, 2014; author, 2013). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Most studies of unions and equality have looked into the evolution of equality policies and the 
effect of unions’ national structures, pointing out the active role of feminists (and the limits of 
their action, see Guillaume, 2013). Less work has been done on the implementation of these 
policies and, above all, very little attention has been paid to the way equality is framed and 
translated into ordinary union work. And yet most of the interviews conducted for this study 
reveal the crucial role played by a small number of local trade unionists in the development of 
equal pay litigation. However we might assess the efficiency of the law, their initiatives, 
whether offensive or defensive, were crucial in persuading their union hierarchy that the case 
they wanted to support was solid and worth committing to and convincing women workers 
that they had a case. The gendered job segregation and the difficulty of understanding what 
‘equal value’ meant combined to prevent low-paid women from thinking themselves as equal. 
Getting women claimants on board also proved very difficult as employers tried to deter them 
from putting in claims by offering them settlement deals (before Christmas) that they 
sometimes preferred to accept for fear of jeopardising the possibility of getting compensation. 
The adversarial nature of the legal procedure, which involves comparing oneself to a male 
comparator who may also be a friend and/or partner, was also quite difficult for the claimants. 
 
While litigation remains a very unusual form of action for trade unionists, an understanding of 
the conditions under which some of them have had recourse to law raises different questions. 
First, it brings up the issue of why trade unions that have strong financial resources and tend 
to characterize their members as rights holders (Vanhala, 2011), two conditions that should 
theoretically encourage litigation strategies, have ended up seeing litigation as a last resort. 
One explanation can be found in shared cultural frameworks regarding the role of trade 
unions and the value attributed to collective bargaining as a preferred mode of action (Colling, 
                                               
35
 Enderby v. Frenchay Health Authority, C-127/92 (1993) IRLR 591 (ECJ). 
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2011). Other entrenched union practices in terms of separate collective bargaining may also 
account for the difficulties trade unionists have had in grasping the potentialities of the “equal 
value” concept and challenging gendered classification systems. If having a narrow mandate 
has been described as being very attuned with the use of litigation (Alter, Vargas, 2000), the 
large scope of activities and the multiple and competing interests of members, can make 
unions quite circumspect toward the defence of individual rights in courts. Even when 
unionists are convinced by the potentiality of litigation for raising members’ rights and/or the 
possibility of using legal action as a lever for collective bargaining, the decision (or not) to 
take legal action cannot be understood without looking at the interactions between local and 
national levels, the cooperation and divisions amongst the union movement. 
 
Second, this study highlights the crucial role of workplace power relations in shaping rights 
campaigns. Depending on the period, equal pay litigation has been facilitated or even 
encouraged by employers’ weakness, ignorance or goodwill, or opposed by their adversarial 
strategies. Unions’ reluctance to litigate is reflected in the fear that litigation might increase 
employers’ intransigence or force them to resort to job and service cuts. Trade unionists have 
been caught between the necessity to hold on while employers appealed and appealed, 
sometimes successfully, and the fear that the union could lose. Interestingly, most of them 
have ended up relying heavily on the support of their lawyers with whom they built very 
strong relationships over the years. By their action, they have managed to keep equal pay on 
the public and union agendas, and have helped to challenge some of the mechanisms that 
contribute to the under-evaluation of women’s work. Despite all the legal hurdles, they have 
demonstrated that the use of the law might help to contest entrenched beliefs about work and 
gender (Albiston, 2005). 
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 Table 1. Characteristics of the interviewees 
 
Position Union Sex Age 
Trade unionists       
Former Senior Policy Officer TUC (ex NALGO) Woman 65-69 
Senior Policy Officer TUC Woman 40-44 
Women's Equality Officer TUC Woman 30-34 
National Women's Officer UNISON (ex NALGO) Woman 55-59 
Former National Equality Officer UNISON (ex COHSE) Woman 50-54 
National Officer, Health service Group UNISON (ex COHSE) Man 45-49 
National Officer, Health service Group UNISON (ex NALGO) Man 35-39 
Senior Regional Officer UNISON (ex NALGO) Woman 50-54 
Regional Organiser UNISON (ex NUPE) Man 45-49 
Regional Women's Officer UNISON (ex NALGO) Woman 35-39 
Regional Organiser UNISON Woman 45-49 
Researcher UNISON (ex GMB) Woman 60-64 
Assistant General Secretary UNITE (ex TNG) Woman 60-64 
Assistant General Secretary UNITE (ex MSF) Woman 60-64 
Former National Officer UNITE (ex TNG) Woman 65-69 
National Officer, Local Government 
Group UNITE (ex MSF) Woman 40-44 
Regional Organiser UNITE (ex GMB) Man 50-54 
National Officer for Equalities UNITE (ex AEU - TNG) Woman 40-44 
Former Equality Officer UNITE (ex GPMU) Woman 50-54 
Researcher PCS Man 50-54 
Regional Organiser UNISON (ex NUPE) Man 50-54 
Legal practioners       
Employment Judge Employment Tribunal Woman 45-49 
Employment Laywer UNISON Man 45-49 
Head of Equality Department Thompson Sollicitors Woman 60-64 
Lawyer Thompson Sollicitors Woman 50-54 
Lawyer Cross Sollicitors Man 50-54 
Lawyer Leigh Day & Co Sollicitors Man 30-34 
Former Equal pay campaigner  Action 4 Equality (ex GMB) Woman 60-64 
Former Equal pay campaigner  Action 4 Equality (ex GMB) Man 60-64 
Former Equal pay campaigner  Action 4 Equality (ex NUPE) Man 50-54 
Former Barrister Old Square Chambers Woman 65-69 
Experts       
Former Head of Equal Pay Unit EOC Woman 65-69 
Independent expert in job evaluation  Woman 60-64 
Head of Equality Department ACAS Man 55-59 
 
 
 
Page 17 of 18
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cje
Cambridge Journal of Economics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 18
Table 2 : Equal pay Claims, 1976-2011. Source : Employment Tribunal Statistics 
 
Equal Pay claims received
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